ABSTRACT In a tactical communication network (TCN), it is important during military operations to provide timely and accurate information transmission. Accordingly, mobility management plays a key role in supporting the mobility and connectivity of mobile nodes (MNs). In battlefield environments, the intermediate nodes(INs), such as a backbone node or an access node, can due to enemy attack be partially or completely damaged. In order to solve these issues, different distributed mobility management (DMM) schemes have been introduced. However, the existing DMM schemes do not offer any efficient solution to maintain the ongoing communication sessions of MNs associated with a destroyed IN. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a robust mobility management scheme for TCNs. The proposed scheme not only enables the disconnected MNs to attach to a new IN, but by creating IP tunnels, also maintains their ongoing communication sessions. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme, we develop a physical test-bed environment. With the help of mathematical and experimental results, we show that the proposed scheme outperforms the legacy schemes in terms of service availability, network throughput, and first packet arrival time.
I. INTRODUCTION
Tactical communication networks (TCNs) consist of mobile nodes (MNs) and intermediate nodes (INs) , such as a backbone node or an access node. To support flexible network construction, the IN communicates with neighboring INs and its associated MNs using point-to-point and point-to-multipoint wireless transmission mode, respectively [1] , [2] . In battlefield environments, the IN can be partially or completely damaged due to enemy attack, and might not be able to provide seamless network services to its associated MNs. This problem can cause difficulties in military operations, where up-to-date information of the battlefield is highly critical. Therefore, TCNs should prepare countermeasures to support service continuity for MNs that are disconnected from the destroyed IN.
TCNs based-on IPv4 are continuously improving, and have moved to IPv6 [3] - [5] . Since during military operations TCNs have to provide timely and accurate information transmission, mobility management plays a key role in supporting the mobility and connectivity of nodes [6] . Several research works on IPv6-based mobility management protocols have been conducted. Amanowicz et al. in [6] have introduced a TCN using Mobile IPv6 (MIPv6) [7] , and have shown that it is possible to adopt mobility management protocol in tactical networks. Reference [8] has proposed a TCN architecture that combines MIPv6 with a Network Mobility (NEMO) protocol to support group mobility [9] . The authors claimed that the proposed architecture could be deployed in short time, and at low cost. Reference [10] has studied a network architecture that adds a central entity for managing efficient routing paths in the converged satellite and terrestrial network. This architecture can also support MNs by mobility management protocol, such as MIPv6 or Proxy Mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6). Although PMIPv6 aims to overcome the limitations of MIPv6 [11] , these protocols still have several issues, such as scalability, signaling overhead, and most importantly, higher network vulnerability, due to a single point of failure (i.e., an anchor) [12] .
To avoid overload of traffic, non-optimal route, and disability of a central anchor, the IETF 1 is working on distributed mobility management (DMM) [12] , [13] . The concept of DMM brings anchor points closer to MNs in the network. In other words, by deploying mobility anchor and access routers (MAARs), the mobility anchor function is moved to the edge of networks. DMM also considers the separation of data plane and control plane, where the data plane is user data packets, and the control plane is binding messages to support the mobility of MN. Therefore, DMM can provide optimal packet transmission, traffic distribution function, and prevention of single point failure [14] , [15] . Unlike commercial networks, anchors in TCNs are more vulnerable to destruction due to enemy attack. Therefore, the use of DMM in TCNs can be a reliable solution to efficiently provide mobility management.
There are two major approaches in DMM, i) partially DMM (PDMM), and ii) fully DMM (FDMM) [16] , [17] . In PDMM, the data plane is distributed among MAARs, where the control plane is mediated by a centralized mobility database (CMD) [16] . The CMD coordinates the binding procedures of MAARs, and stores overall information of MNs in the network. On the other hand, in FDMM, both the data and control planes are distributed among the MAARs [17] . However, the lack of knowledge of other MAARs and their network prefixes becomes a serious obstacle to supporting the mobility management of MNs [16] . Furthermore, FDMM has not recently defined binding procedures between the previous MAAR and serving MAAR [18] . More specifically, military communication is highly prioritized, and cannot afford communication delays, or anchor point destruction. In terms of monitoring and management by the database, the PDMM with a CMD is a more efficient approach than FDMM.
In this paper, we propose a robust mobility management scheme using a PDMM scheme to maintain ongoing communication sessions for disconnected MNs from the destroyed anchor point in battlefield environments. The role of anchor point is performed by IN in TCNs. We implement test-bed environments to compare and analyze the mobility protocols, namely PMIPv6 and PDMM. In addition, using our test-bed environment, we evaluate the performance of our proposed PDMM compared with legacy PMIPv6 and PDMM. Our testbed results also show that when an anchor point is destroyed, the proposed scheme can successfully resume the ongoing communication sessions of its associated MNs. In addition, our mathematical results show that the service availability in proposed PDMM scheme is significantly higher than legacy PDMM scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the preliminaries for this work. Section III explains the proposed schemes using PDMM. Section IV presents the mathematical analysis for service availability. Section V provides the analytic and experimental evaluations, while Section VI concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
IPv6-based mobility management allows an MN to keep its IP address, even if the MN changes its point of network attachment [19] . IPv6-based mobility management protocols provide network-based mobility management, such as PMIPv6, PDMM, and FDMM. In network-based protocols, the anchor point is responsible for maintaining the reachability state of MNs, and is the topological point for MNs. The anchor point also supports communication sessions for packet transmission of MNs by using binding messages, such as a proxy binding update (PBU), and a proxy binding acknowledgment (PBA) [20] . In IPv6-based mobility management protocols, a stateless address auto-configuration mechanism can be applied to get IPv6 addresses to MNs [21] , [22] .
A. PROXY MOBILE IPV6
The PMIPv6, which is a network-based mobility management, is standardized by the IETF [11] . Figure 1(b) shows that the PMIPv6 consists of a local mobility anchor (LMA), and a mobile access gateway (MAG). The LMA is a home agent for MNs in the PMIPv6 domain. As a central anchor point, it is responsible for allocating the IPv6 addresses of MNs, and managing their connection states. The LMA also acts as a control plane and the data plane manager in the PMIPv6 domain. On the other hand, the role of MAG is to provide mobility support on behalf of MNs. Furthermore, the MAG is also responsible for tracking the movement of MNs, and exchanging binding messages with the LMA, to maintain communication sessions while moving around in the PMIPv6 domain. Figure 1(b) shows the operation of PMIPv6.
In the attachment phase, as the MN attaches to MAG 1 using a router solicitation (RS) message including MN identifier (MN-ID), the MAG 1 sends a PBU message including MN-ID to the LMA. After receiving the PBU message, the LMA creates a binding cache entry (BCE) to store the mobility information of MN. The LMA also sets an IP tunnel for the communication session, and sends a PBA message to the MAG 1 that includes the MN-ID, a unique network prefix called the home network prefix (HNP), and the lifetime. When the MAG 1 receives the PBA message, it sets the IP tunnel and routing toward the LMA. After that, the MAG 1 sends a router advertisement (RA) message that includes the unique network prefix to the MN. The MN configures the IPv6 address using the unique network prefix, and requests network service (i.e., data flow) via MAG 1.
In the handover phase, when the MN changes the point of attachment, the routing state information is adjusted using PBU and PBA messages between the LMA and the MAG 1. By updating the routing state information, the IP tunnel changes the route from MAG 1 to MAG 2. When the MN roams the network, the LMA updates its associated BCE containing MN-ID, the unique network prefix, and serving MAG.
B. PARTIALLY DISTRIBUTED MOBILITY MANAGEMENT
In order to solve the issues of the PMIPv6 having a central anchor point, the IETF has researched the concept of VOLUME 6, 2018 a distributed mobility management (DMM) paradigm [15] . Therefore, DMM has a flat network architecture, and the mobility anchors are distributed and managed near the edge of the network. Furthermore, since there are standardization protocols for MIPv6 and PMIPv6, extending the conventional mobility protocol has been researched [12] , [13] . Among the various DMM based solutions, PMIPv6-based distributed mobility management is considered as partially DMM (PDMM) by the IETF [16] .
The PDMM leads to a distributed data plane via anchor points placed close to the MNs. For the control plane, a central database type entity known as the central mobility database (CMD) is deployed in the PDMM domain. The CMD performs binding procedures, and stores the overall mobility information of MNs into a BCE in the PDMM domain. Figure 2 (a) shows that the architecture of PDMM consists of a CMD and mobility anchor and access routers (MAARs). The MAAR is a first hop access router, and plays the role of anchor for assigning IPv6 addresses, and running the functionalities of both LMA and MAG. The MAAR leverages the CMD to access and update information of the associated MNs using the binding messages (i.e., PBU and PBA) between the CMD and the MAAR.
Figure 2(b) shows the detailed operation of the PDMM. In the attachment phase, when an MN attaches to MAAR 1 using RS message, the MAAR 1 reserves a network prefix into a temporal local BCE. This network prefix is then sent to the CMD using a PBU message. The PBU message also contains the MN-ID. The CMD stores a global BCE containing the MN-ID, network prefix, and serving MAAR address in the access router (AR) [23] . After creating the BCE, the CMD informs the MAAR 1 via PBA message. The MAAR 1 then converts temporal local BCE to permanent, and sends an RA message to the MN for assigning an IPv6 address. After allocating an IPv6 address to the MN, the MN can use network service with pref1 through its attached MAAR.
In the case of the handover phase, when the MN moves from MAAR 1 to MAAR 2, the MAAR 2 reserves a network prefix to store a temporal local BCE. The MAAR 2 then sends a PBU message including the network prefix to the CMD for MN registration. After PBU message reception and BCE lookup, the CMD retrieves the already existing entry for the MN. The CMD then forwards a PBA message to MAAR 2 that includes the IPv6 address of MAAR 1 for setting the IP tunnel. In parallel, the CMD also forwards the PBU message to the MAAR 1, which message includes the IPv6 address of MAAR 2 to inform movement of the MN. The MAAR 1 then sets an IP tunnel toward MAAR 2, which maintains MN's communication session by updating its routing state information. After creating the IP tunnel, the MN communicates with CN via the IP tunnel between MAAR 1 and MAAR 2 in terms of the network service with pref1. If the MN wants to access new network service, this service is established from MAAR 2 by using pref2.
III. PROPOSED MOBILITY MANAGEMENT SCHEME
In battlefield environments, anchor points in a TCN can be destroyed by enemy attack. However, to the best of our knowledge, there does not exist any efficient solution to maintain the ongoing communication session of MNs who were previously associated with the destroyed anchor. Mobility protocols, such as PMIPv6, where there is a centralized anchor (i.e., LMA), cannot provide the network services when the anchor is destroyed by enemy attack. Therefore, the distributed approach known as PDMM is a more efficient mobility management solution. In legacy PDMM, since the CMD is a centralized entity, its destruction can disturb the network services. The use of cloud-based distributed databases in battlefield is one of possible solutions [18] , [24] - [26] . However, in this paper, we consider a more realistic scenario where a CMD is physically deployed in a TCN. In addition, we also propose a novel solution to maintain the network services in case of CMD destruction. 
A. IN CASE OF MAAR DESTRUCTION
In order to communicate with CNs, MNs in PDMM establish a connection using the IPv6 address assigned by the serving anchor (i.e., home anchor). In the case when the home anchor is destroyed, the communication session between its associated MNs and their CNs cannot be maintained. This is because of two main reasons: i) the destroyed home anchor cannot create an IP tunnel with the new serving anchors, and ii) due to BCE timeout, the CMD deletes the mobility information of the destroyed home anchor. In TCNs, the information is highly time critical, and establishing a new connection is a time-consuming and cumbersome procedure that also incurs huge signaling overhead (i.e., exchanging binding messages and routing updates in the network). Thus, instead of establishing a whole new connection, we propose a novel robust mobility management scheme, where the ongoing communication sessions are rerouted. This can continually maintain the ongoing communication sessions, and significantly reduce the first packet arrival time between MN and CNs. Figure 3 shows the operation of our proposed TCN. In our proposed TCN, we consider that MN 1 is communicating with CN 1 and CN 2 via MAAR 1, while MN 2 is only communicating with CN 2 via MAAR 2. We assume the scenario where MAAR 1 is destroyed by enemy attack, and its associated MN 1 attaches itself to a neighboring MAAR (i.e., MAAR 2). The CMD supports this attachment operation by using extended BCE (eBCE), and creating two IP tunnels. The first IP tunnel is created between CN 1's MAAR (i.e., MAAR 3) and MN 1's newly serving MAAR (i.e., MAAR 2). The second IP tunnel is created between CN 2's MAAR (i.e., MAAR 4) and the MAAR 2. The IP tunnels in our proposed scheme are created to maintain the ongoing communication session.
The entire proposed procedure can be divided into two main phases (i.e., see Figure 4 ). In phase 1, the CMD identifies the destroyed MAAR by using a periodically management message (MM). Once the destroyed MAAR 1 is identified, the CMD then discovers relay MAARs (i.e., MAAR 3 and MAAR 4) by using a MM in the TCN. The relay MAARs are the serving MAARs of CNs communicating with MN 1. After the CMD discovers the relay MAARs through their management acknowledgment message (MA), it stores their information in the eBCE. In phase 2, the disconnected MN 1 sends a connection request to the neighboring MAAR (i.e., MAAR 2). After receiving MN's request, the MAAR 2 sends a binding message to the CMD for registration. From the received binding message, the CMD can recognize that MN 1 has ongoing communication sessions by searching the eBCE. The CMD then sends extended binding messages to create an IP tunnel between the newly serving MAAR 2 and relay MAARs (i.e., MAAR 3 and MAAR 4). Figure 4 shows the signaling flow of both phases 1 and 2, and their detailed procedure is given below. 
1) PHASE 1
At this stage, we assume that MN 1 is already attached to its serving MAAR 1, and has obtained IPv6 address with pref1 using the attachment procedure explained in Section II. In order to check the status of MAAR 1, we propose a new message type called management message (MM) and management acknowledgement message (MA). 
2) PHASE 2
In phase 2, the MN 1 attaches to a neighboring MAAR (i.e., MAAR 2), by sending an RS message. After receiving the RS message, the MAAR 2 sends a PBU message to the CMD, which contains the network prefix called pref2. Upon receiving the PBU message, the CMD looks up the eBCE to retrieve the already existing entry of MN 1. Since the CMD already knows that the MN 1 has unfinished communication sessions, it sends the extended PBU message to relay MAARs (i.e., MAAR 3 and MAAR 4), and an extended PBA message to the newly serving MAAR (i.e., MAAR 2). The extended PBU message contains the pref1 assigned by the destroyed MAAR 1, IPv6 address of the serving MAAR 2, and R flag to inform the relay MAARs that the MN 1 is resuming its ongoing communication session. On the other hand, the extended PBA message contains the pref1 assigned by the destroyed MAAR 1, the pref2 assigned by the newly serving MAAR 2, and IPv6 addresses of relay MAARs about the unfinished communication sessions of MN 1. After receiving the binding messages, IP tunnels are created between the serving MAAR 2 and relay MAARs. Once IP tunnels are successfully created, the MAAR 2 sends an RA message to MN 1, which includes pref1 and pref2. Upon receiving the RA message, the MN 1 configures its previous IPv6 address and new IPv6 address with pref1 and pref2, respectively. Finally, the MN 1 resumes its unfinished communication sessions with CN 1 and CN 2 by using pref1, where pref2 is used when a new session is established. Note that in the above-mentioned scenario, we consider that both a MN and CNs are in the same domain. However, in the case when a CN is in a different domain (see Figure 2(a) ), there always exists a MAAR that acts as a gateway to the CN. Therefore, our proposed scheme has the ability to resume the ongoing communication sessions of the MN regardless of the location of the CN.
B. IN CASE OF CMD DESTRUCTION
In PDMM, the role of CMD is to manage all the mobility information in the domain and perform the binding procedure. Therefore, the CMD destruction can hinder the network services of a TCN. To tackle this issue, we propose an alternate robust solution where a MAAR takeovers the role of the destroyed CMD. The whole procedure is shown in Figure 6 . Whenever the MAAR 1 receives a connection request or an IP address lifetime extension request from a MN, it sends a VOLUME 6, 2018 PBU request to CMD. The expiration of PBU message will indicate that the corresponding CMD is destroyed and then the MAAR 1 decides to take over the role of CMD.
In order to announce the role of a new CMD to all other MAARs in the domain, the MAAR 1 sends a MM including the H flag. After receiving this MM, all of the MAARs respond with MA messages including the local mobility information of MNs sRerved by them. After successfully gathering all of the local mobility information, the MAAR 1 starts acting as an active new CMD in the domain. 
IV. ANALYSIS OF SERVICE AVAILABILITY FOR ONGOING COMMUNICATION SESSION
In order to mathematically evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme, we derived the mathematical expressions to obtain the service availability for an ongoing communication session. The term service availability means that a MN maintains its ongoing communication session when other network entities (such as MAAR and CMD) are destroyed. We assume a network which consists of a MN, a CMD, and N MAARs, where the MN is associated with one of the MAARs. The failure of both CMD and MAAR are modeled as a Poisson process with parameters λ a and λ b , respectively. Furthermore, the repair rates of the failed CMD and MAARs are also modeled as a Poisson process with parameters µ a and µ b , respectively. A continuous-time Markov chain model (Fig. 7) is constructed to represent network state (i, j) for i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N } [28] . Here i and j denote numbers of CMD and MAARs failed by enemy's attack, respectively.
Let π i,j denote steady-state probability that the network is in state (i, j) . From Figure 7 , we can obtain (N + 1) global balance equations as follows
Also, the local balance equations can be constructed as
where
Using Eqs. (1) and (2), steady-state probabilities can be obtained in terms of π 0,0 .
for all i ∈ {0, 1} and j ∈ {0, 1,
where ρ A = λ A /µ A . From the fact that the sum of the probabilities must equal to 1,
Therefore, steady-state probabilities can be expressed as
We assume that a MAAR serves a MN and it is destroyed at time 0. The destroyed MAAR will be repaired after time T b , where T b is an exponential random variable (RV) with parameter µ b . In the legacy PDMM, after MAAR destruction, the MN will not be able to receive its packets from the CN until the destroyed MAAR is repaired at time T b . This problem has been mentioned in Section III. However, in our proposed scheme, the MN is newly connected to one of the well-functioning MAARs after T r and then it receives packets through the new MAAR. Here, T r denotes the time taken for rerouting the corresponding ongoing communication session to the new MAAR. Figure 8 shows the timing diagram for events after a MAAR is destroyed.
Let Z be the service available time portion of a MN after that its serving MAAR is destroyed. In our proposed scheme, Z can be defined as The mean value of Z can be computed as
The conditional expectation of Z , E[Z |T b ] can be expressed as
where f X (x) is the density function of RV X . Substituting Eq. (8) into Eq. (7), E[Z ] can be simply expressed as
In the legacy PDMM scheme, since the MN is not able to be served by the destroyed MAAR, Z becomes 0 at T b . After the MAAR is repaired at T b , both legacy and proposed schemes provide services to the MN until the MAAR is destroyed again. Finally, service availability of an ongoing communication session can be obtained as
For the proposed PDMM scheme, E[Z ] can be obtained from Eq. (9), and for the legacy PDMM scheme, the value of E[Z ] = 0.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS A. ANALYTIC RESULTS FOR SERVICE AVAILABILITY
For simplification, we assume that λ a = λ b , µ a = µ b , and T r has exponential distribution with µ r . Thus, E[Z ] can be derived from Eq. (9) as Figure 9 shows the service availability of an ongoing communication sessions under varying values of λ a (= λ b ) for different values of µ a (= µ b ). The value of µ r is set to 0.303/second which is obtained from experiments. It can be observed that the proposed PDMM scheme outperforms the legacy PDMM scheme for all values of µ a (= µ b ) in terms of 
B. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
This section provides details on our experimental setup and the evaluation of our proposed scheme. In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme, we construct a real test-bed based-on PDMM open source solution. 2 Figures 10 show our physical test-bed environment. More specifically, Figure 10 (a) is the logical view of our considered TCN, while Figure 10(b) is the physical implementation of the network model discussed in Section III (see Figure 3) . The deployed test-bed consists of five Linux Ubuntu 10.04 LTS 32-bit virtual machines (running a Linux-2.6.32 kernel) on one regular PC, playing the role of four MAARs and one CMD. 3 Furthermore, four laptops (i.e., running Windows 10 OS) are used as two MNs and two CNs for wireless access and wired access, respectively. Wireless local area network access points (WLAN APs) using IEEE 802.11g are used as an access technology for MAARs. For APs, we use USB adapters having ipTIME N600UA chipsets and open source hardware (Raspberry Pi B+). 4 Each Raspberry-Pi is connected to their respective MAAR (i.e., a virtual machine in one regular PC) via USB Ethernet adapter. The message exchange process between Raspberry-Pi and MAAR is performed using Python-based socket programming. In order to compare our proposed scheme with an existing protocol, we additionally construct a test-bed for PMIPv6 using an open source solution. 5 In our testbed environment, the CMD sends MMs to detect destroyed MAAR every second. In addition, the transmission control protocol (TCP) transmission rate between MNs and CNs is fixed to 5 Mb/s, and the traffic is generated 5 OAI-PMIPv6: http://www.umip.org/. using iPerf-2.0.5 application. 6 Furthermore, the iPerf is also used to measure the achievable average data rate per second between MN and CN. The TCP packets sequence number and packet arrival time between MNs and CNs are measured using Wireshark application. 7 The CMD in our experimental setup is attached to the same local subnet. For performance evaluation, we consider the scenario explained in Section III, which for the sake of brevity, is not explained here. The results are obtained by repeating the experiment more than 40 times.
In order to know the state of ongoing communication sessions, we establish three different TCP sessions, session 1 is between MN 1 and CN1, session 2 is between MN 1 and CN 2, and session 3 is between MN 2 and CN 2. The MN 1, MN 2, CN 1, and CN 2 are associated with MAAR 1, MAAR 2, MAAR 3 and MAAR 4, respectively (see Figure 10(a) ). The MAAR 1 is destroyed in 31 seconds. Figure 11 shows the sequence number of arriving TCP segments of all three sessions as time goes by. Figures 11(a) and 11(b) show that even after MAAR 1 destruction, the TCP communication sessions 1 and 2 are successfully resumed in our proposed scheme. The reason is that the CMD keeps the BCE information of MN 1 and reroutes its TCP traffic to a new serving MAAR. On the other hands, in legacy PMIPv6 and PDMM schemes, both sessions 1 and 2 are dropped. In PMIPv6, since MAAR 1 works as LMA, all BCE information is lost due to LMA destruction. Thus, all sessions are disconnected. The legacy PDMM cannot resume the ongoing communication sessions of MNs associated with the destroyed MAAR 1 because the CMD deletes their BCE information. Furthermore, it can be observed from Figure 11 (c) that the session 3 is successfully maintained in both legacy and proposed PDMM schemes without any disruption. However, because of the abovementioned reason, PMIPv6 fails to maintain the ongoing communication session 3. Figure 12 shows the overall network throughput of the ongoing communication sessions. It can be observed that when MAAR 1 is destroyed (i.e., Time = 31 seconds), the network throughput of all three schemes significantly drops. However, among all three schemes, the network throughput of only the proposed scheme successfully recovers back to normal. This is because both PMIPv6 and legacy PDMM do not offer any solution to resume the ongoing communication sessions of disconnected MNs. Figure 13 shows the first packet arrival time after MAAR 1 is destroyed. It is evident that the proposed PDMM outperforms the legacy PDMM. The first packet arrival time is the sum of the WLAN association time, binding procedure time, and session establishment time. The binding procedure time is defined as the amount of time in which MN receives the RA message from its serving MAAR, and the time required for updating the routing table and creating IP tunnels. On the other hand, the session establishment time is the time interval required to create a session between MN and CN. The first packet arrival time in our proposed PDMM is less than 3.5 seconds in more than 90 percent of experiments. On the other hand, in the legacy PDMM, the first packet arrival time is around 4.3 seconds in more than 90 percent of experiments. This is because instead of establishing a new connection, the proposed scheme resumes the ongoing communication sessions using IP tunnels between MAARs. However, in the legacy PDMM, the ongoing communication session is dropped, and a completely new connection is established, which requires more binding procedure time and session establishment time.
For normal handover, all three protocols keep their ongoing communication sessions as shown in Figure 14 (a). MN 1 fails to receive TCP segments during handover but successfully receives TCP segments after the handover. Since the binding procedures in PMIPv6 (i.e., between LMA and MAG) and PDMM (i.e., between CMD and MAAR) are similar, the handover latencies of three protocols are very close to each other as shown in Figure 14(b) . Furthermore, in the proposed scheme, the handover procedure is same as for the legacy PDMM. The results show that the handover latency is less than 2.3 s for more than 90 percent of the handover. Since the communication in TCNs is highly time critical, more efficient schemes are required to reduce the handover latency. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a robust mobility management scheme to support ongoing communication sessions in the TCN when a MAAR is destroyed. To support ongoing communication sessions, we defined a new management message. The CMD in our proposed scheme uses this management message to check the connection status of MAARs, and discover relay MAARs. In order to maintain the ongoing communication sessions of disconnected MNs, the proposed scheme creates IP tunnels between the new serving MAAR and relay MAARs. Although our proposed scheme incurs signaling overhead for the MM message compared to the legacy PDMM scheme, the proposed scheme can continuously provide the ongoing communication session to the MN through additional signaling. A physical test-bed environment has been constructed to evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme. The experimental results show that compared to legacy schemes, the proposed scheme can successfully maintain the ongoing communication sessions of the disconnected MN. We also show that in terms of first packet arrival time and network throughput, the proposed scheme performs significantly better than the legacy schemes. Through the analytic evaluations, our proposed PDMM yields better performance than the legacy PDMM in terms of service availability. As a future work, we aim to study the impact of FDMM scheme without any centralized entity on TCNs.
